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NONDELEGATION OF MAJOR QUESTIONS
Clinton T. Summers*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has many tools at its disposal to address
improper delegations of legislative power by Congress to the
executive branch. Two of these tools are the nondelegation
doctrine and the major questions doctrine.1 The nondelegation
doctrine is a sledgehammer. Able to declare entire statutory
provisions unconstitutional, its ability to do a lot of damage is
perhaps the reason the Court never uses it.2 Indeed, the Court has
only used it twice, both times in 1935.3 Although it’s old and
rusty, the Court continues to keep it in the toolbox just in case.4
Since 1935, the Court has been using other, seemingly less
destructive tools to do similar work.5 As recently pointed out by
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, the modern major questions
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his helpful guidance and feedback during the writing process. The author also thanks
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government; his grandparents for their love and encouragement; and his remaining family
and friends for all their support during law school.
1. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
2. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that the Court has “almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
applying the law” because the judicial branch is in no better position to decide that question).
3. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364
(2001).
4. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (plurality opinion) (announcing in the first sentence
of the opinion that “[t]he nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its
legislative power to another branch of Government” but refraining from enforcing the
doctrine and upholding the delegation at issue).
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315-16
(2000).
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doctrine is one of these tools.6 There are, of course, others in the
toolbox.7
This Article provides a background of the nondelegation
doctrine and the major questions doctrine and examines their
similarities and differences. It highlights the Court’s latest
nondelegation case, Gundy v. United States, where an eightmember Court ultimately upheld the delegation at issue there,8 but
four Justices clearly would have used the rusty sledgehammer to
demolish it.9 This Article also notes Justice Kavanaugh’s
statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Paul v. United
States, where he responded to Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent
and likened the nondelegation doctrine to the major questions
doctrine.10 This Article explores Justice Kavanaugh’s unique
view of the major questions doctrine.
Because of the recent surge in interest to revive the
nondelegation doctrine, and because the Court’s current test for
measuring delegations has prevented the Court from enforcing the
doctrine, this Article ultimately proposes that the “major
questions” test from the major questions doctrine should become
the new basis for enforcing the nondelegation doctrine. This
Article does not seek to explore the many arguments for or against
the nondelegation doctrine in general. Decades of scholarship
exist on the topic.11 Rather, this Article proposes a new test for
the doctrine in response to these recent developments.
6. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141-42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that both the major
questions doctrine and the void-for-vagueness doctrine are two tools the Court uses to rein
in improper delegations); Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari) (explaining that the major questions doctrine is “closely
related” to the traditional nondelegation doctrine).
7. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5, at 330-35.
8. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (plurality opinion).
9. Justice Gorsuch wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas. Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but
likely would have joined the dissent if there would have been another Justice on the Court to
supply a majority opinion. See id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
10. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
11. For criticism of the doctrine, see, for example, Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). For a recent attack
of the doctrine on historical and originalist grounds, see Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas
Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3512154. For a direct response to that article, see Philip Hamburger,
Delegating or Divesting?, 115 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2020). For a further glimpse into
the modern support of the doctrine, see, for example, Ronald A. Cass, Delegation
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II. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
A. Background
The principle of nondelegation—that Congress may not
delegate its lawmaking power to others—is rooted in the
Constitution’s separation of powers and derived from the
language in Article I.12 That Article begins, “All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States . . . .”13 As John Locke explained:
The power of the Legislative being derived from the People
by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other,
than what that positive Grant conveyed, which being only to
make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can
have no power to transfer their Authority of making Laws,
and place it in other hands.14

Therefore, at least in theory, any statute enacted by Congress
that transfers “legislative power” to another branch violates the
nondelegation doctrine and shall be declared unconstitutional by
the courts if challenged.15
As the plurality in Gundy defined it, “[t]he nondelegation
doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to
another branch of Government.”16 By defining it, the plurality of
course recognized that the doctrine exists and may be used to
strike down impermissible delegations.17 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has continually reaffirmed the doctrine’s existence and
announced its core tenets with confidence.18 Yet the doctrine is
Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 147 (2017), Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV.
327 (2002), and DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1995).
12. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (plurality opinion).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
14. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 141, in JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 363 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)
(emphasis omitted).
15. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001).
16. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (“[Article I’s] text permits no delegation of
those [legislative] powers”); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77,
85 (1932) (“That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear.”);

86

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74:1

not actually enforced—at least not literally.19 Congress routinely
delegates the authority to regulate, and administrative agencies
today make more rules governing private conduct than Congress
itself.20 When asked to strike down these delegations as
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme
Enforcing the doctrine,
Court routinely upholds them.21
therefore, has become a line-drawing exercise between
constitutional and unconstitutional delegations. Only twice has
the Court ever held that a delegation crossed that line of
constitutionality.22 Both cases were decided in 1935 and involved
the same New Deal act.23
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court struck down a
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) that
granted the President the power to “prohibit” (if he chose) the
interstate transportation of petroleum in excess of state law
quotas.24 The Court examined its prior nondelegation cases, all
of which had upheld delegations on the basis that Congress had
declared (at a minimum) its general policy before the delegee
could act.25 In the delegation at hand, the Court concluded that
Congress “ha[d] declared no policy, ha[d] established no
standard, [and] ha[d] laid down no rule” by which the President
was required to follow.26 The statute gave the President complete
discretion to decide whether interstate transportation of excess

Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power . . . is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of [our] system of government . . . .”); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (“It will not be contended that Congress can delegate . . . powers
which are strictly and exclusively legislative.”).
19. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 322 (noting that the “doctrine has had one good year,
and 211 bad ones (and counting)”).
20. See Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 718, 720-21 (2019).
21. Id. at 725-26.
22. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
23. David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224-25 (1985).
24. See Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 406, 430.
25. See id. at 423-30.
26. Id. at 430.
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petroleum should be prohibited27—a decision, the Court held, that
Congress must make.28
In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court
struck down another section of the NIRA that “authorize[d] the
President to approve ‘codes of fair competition’” for virtually any
industry or trade.29 Pursuant to the Act, the President issued an
executive order and established the “Live Poultry Code,” which
imposed numerous regulations on the poultry industry in New
York City, including slaughterhouses like the Schechters’.30 Each
violation of the code constituted a criminal offense, and the
Schechters were convicted on eighteen counts in federal court.31
At the outset of its analysis, the Court recognized that the power
delegated by this section of the NIRA was significantly more
broad than the statutory grant in Panama Refining.32 In Panama
Refining, the authority granted was narrowly defined: the
President could decide whether or not to prohibit the interstate
transportation of excess petroleum.33 Here, the President could
establish vast codes of regulations that would affect entire
industries.34
Although the NIRA seemingly limited the
President’s power to enact codes by providing “condition[s]” of
approval, these conditions did nothing to limit the President’s
substantive policy-making discretion.35 The Court found this
discretion to be “virtually unfettered” and concluded that the
“code-making authority thus conferred [was] an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.”36 In his concurrence, Justice
Cardozo called it “delegation running riot.”37
In terms of enforcing the nondelegation doctrine, these cases
have not been followed.38 The “intelligible principle” test
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id. at 406.
See id. at 430.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-22, 551 (1935).
Id. at 523-25.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 530.
Id.
See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541-42.
Id. at 538-39.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
See 1 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 138 (6th ed. 2019).
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eventually became the standard by which all delegations would
be measured (and upheld).39 As the plurality stated it in Gundy,
“a statutory delegation is constitutional as long as Congress
‘lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated
authority] is directed to conform.’”40 Therefore, while legislative
power theoretically may not be delegated to another branch, the
Court has upheld nearly every delegation it has faced because it
has determined that Congress provided an “intelligible principle”
sufficient to limit the delegated authority.41 Some of the most
common justifications for allowing Congress to delegate in this
way include: (1) Congress’s lack of technical expertise and
inability to understand the implications of difficult policy
decisions,42 (2) the idea that executive agencies are politically
accountable,43 (3) the principle that courts should not substitute
Congress’s intent to delegate with their own policy judgments,44
and (4) the general assertion that, in today’s complex society,
Congress simply cannot do its job without the ability to
delegate.45
So, what qualifies as an “intelligible principle”? The answer
is pretty much anything. The Court has found an intelligible
principle in even the most broad and seemingly limitless
delegations.46 For example, the Court has upheld delegations that
grant authority to make decisions that are “generally fair and

39. See Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1857
(2019).
40. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (brackets in original)
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).
41. See Coglianese, supra note 39, at 1855-57. It’s important to note, however, that
some scholars have argued that authority conferred to the executive branch by statute is not
a delegation of legislative power at all. Rather, Congress exercises its legislative power when
it confers the power, and the executive branch exercises “executive” power when it acts in
accordance with the statutory grant. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1723.
42. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 38, at 150.
43. See id. at 152-54.
44. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (“[W]e
have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree
of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’”) (citations
omitted).
45. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
46. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 11, at 167-68.
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equitable”47 and in the “public interest.”48 Many scholars have
recognized, I think rightly, that these kinds of standards are
meaningless.49 Consequently, these standards give agencies and
other bodies vast discretion to make generally applicable rules
that regulate private conduct and society as a whole.50
It is worth noting, however, that the “intelligible principle”
language comes from J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States,51 a case decided in 1928, seven years before Panama
Refining and Schechter Poultry. Yet, in those cases, the Court did
not rely on the so-called “test” to strike down the delegations as
unconstitutional. Panama Refining only referred to the phrase in
passing when discussing J.W. Hampton but did not rely on the
phrase for its holding.52 Schechter Poultry never mentioned
“intelligible principle” at all.53 As Justice Gorsuch pointed out,
“the phrase sat more or less silently entombed until the late
1940s” when “lawyers beg[a]n digging it up in earnest . . . .”54
The intelligible principle test, however, remains the primary test
used by the courts today.55
B. Gundy and SORNA
In the Supreme Court’s latest nondelegation case, Gundy v.
United States, a four-Justice plurality declared the particular
delegation at issue one that “easily passes constitutional muster”

47. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944).
48. E.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
49. See, e.g, HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 38, at 133; Cass, supra note 11, at 16770; Lawson, supra note 11, at 328-29; see also WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG
MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 217 (1974) (Justice Douglas opining in his autobiography that
“‘[p]ublic interest’ is too vague a standard to be left to free-wheeling administrators.”).
50. Cf. Gordon, supra note 20, at 720-21, 724.
51. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
52. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935).
53. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935)
(discussing J.W. Hampton but not quoting its “intelligible principle” language).
54. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
55. Compare id. at 2123 (plurality opinion) (affirming the “intelligible principle”
standard as the primary test), with id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing
with the plurality that the delegation at issue passes the “approach [the] Court has taken for
many years” but suggesting a readiness to abandon that approach if a majority of the Court
were willing to do so).
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under the intelligible principle approach.56 Justice Alito curiously
agreed but concurred only in the judgment because he would
“reconsider the approach [the Court] ha[s] taken for the past 84
years.”57 He did not join the dissent, however, because “a
majority is not willing to do that, [and] it would be freakish to
single out the provision at issue here for special treatment.”58
Critical to Alito’s decision, Justice Kavanaugh was not on the
Court when Gundy was argued and thus did not participate in the
outcome to supply a majority opinion one way or the other.59
Justice Gorsuch wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas, and disagreed with the plurality’s
interpretation of the statute.60 More importantly, Gorsuch
asserted that the “intelligible principle” test for measuring
delegations “has no basis in the original meaning of the
Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it was
plucked”61 and argued that it should be abandoned in favor of
more traditional principles.62 Thus, four Justices expressed
interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine (counting Justice
Alito). That is significant. The last time even two Justices
advocated in a single case for enforcing the nondelegation
doctrine was in 1981.63
Gundy involved a provision of the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA).64 Passed in 2006, the Act created
a nationwide system of mandatory registration for those convicted
of sex offenses.65 The Act’s registration requirements thus clearly
applied to all future sex offenders.66 But for those convicted of

56. Id. at 2121 (plurality opinion). Justice Kagan wrote for the plurality, joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
57. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. Id.
59. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2120. In fact, Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed by the Senate
only four days after Gundy was argued. See Petition for Rehearing, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116
(No. 17-6086), 2019 WL 3202508, at *1-2.
60. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145-48 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2139.
62. See id. at 2136-41.
63. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-44
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
64. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (plurality opinion); 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2006).
65. See 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901, 20911-13.
66. See 34 U.S.C. § 20913(b).
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sex offenses before SORNA’s enactment, Congress granted to the
Attorney General “the authority to specify the applicability of the
[Act’s] requirements . . . and to prescribe rules for the registration
of any such sex offenders.”67
Petitioner Herman Gundy, a pre-Act sex offender, was
convicted for failing to register under SORNA, a crime
punishable by fine, imprisonment up to ten years, or both.68
Gundy challenged that conviction under the nondelegation
doctrine, arguing that Congress impermissibly delegated
legislative power to the Attorney General by allowing the
Attorney General to specify SORNA’s applicability to pre-Act
offenders.69 The four-Justice plurality, along with the help of
Justice Alito’s concurrence in the judgment, upheld the
delegation as constitutional because the Act contained an
“intelligible principle” that sufficiently limited the Attorney
General’s authority.70
In the plurality’s view, “Congress had made clear in
SORNA’s text that the new registration requirements would apply
to pre-Act offenders.”71 Although Congress did not state it
explicitly in the text, the plurality construed SORNA to require
the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s registration
requirements to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible.”72 The
plurality discovered this intelligible principle after doing some
statutory interpretation, looking to the Act’s stated purpose, its
definition of “sex offender,” and its legislative history.73
Although it may seem unusual for the plurality to infer a standard
that the Act never explicitly stated, the Court has previously
construed statutes to find similar standards.74 The dissent,
67. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).
68. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122; see 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2016).
69. Brief for Petitioner, at 23-24, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086).
70. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129-30.
71. Id. at 2125.
72. Id. at 2121.
73. See id. at 2123, 2126-29.
74. The plurality pointed to Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001)
and Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104-05 (1946) as two examples. Gundy,
139 S. Ct. at 2123. Even Justice Rehnquist looked to legislative history and statutory context
in the “Benzene case” in his attempt to ascertain a more definite standard beyond the
explicitly stated feasibility standard there. See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (The
Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 675-82 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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however, took issue with the plurality’s interpretation because the
“feasibility” standard was nowhere to be found in SORNA’s
text.75 Justice Gorsuch said it was a figment of the government’s
(and the plurality’s) imagination.76 But even if the statute
contained such a limitation, Gorsuch argued, it still left the
Attorney General “free to make all the important policy
decisions” regarding how SORNA applied to pre-Act offenders.77
The first line of the dissent explains Gorsuch’s general
argument: “The Constitution promises that only the people’s
elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting
liberty.”78 He expanded that argument and stressed the idea that,
at a minimum, Congress may not delegate to others its power to
make rules that restrict the people’s liberty.79 Notwithstanding
that general principle, Gorsuch looked to caselaw and outlined
three ways in which Congress may permissibly delegate its power
to regulate: (1) when Congress makes the policy decisions but
authorizes another branch to “fill up the details”;80 (2) when
Congress makes the application of its pre-decided rule
conditioned on executive fact-finding;81 and (3) when Congress
assigns authority to another branch that the Constitution already
vests in that other branch.82
Gorsuch argued that when Justice Taft first wrote of an
“intelligible principle” in J.W. Hampton, he only used the phrase
to explain the operation of the traditional tests as used in prior
cases, not alter their analysis.83 The simple “remark” eventually
“[took] on a life of its own” when lawyers began arguing that the
broad phrase displaced the Court’s traditional tests.84 For decades
now, the Court has been using the intelligible principle “test” as
Moreover, the Supreme Court has regularly construed ambiguous statutes in a way that
avoids serious constitutional questions. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
75. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145-46 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2145.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2131.
79. See id. at 2131, 2133-34.
80. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2137.
83. Id. at 2139.
84. Id.
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the primary way to measure delegations.85 Gorsuch explained,
however, that some of the Court’s decisions under the intelligible
principle test are likely consistent with the more traditional tests.86
Gorsuch then went on to apply the traditional tests to
SORNA.87 While admitting that what qualifies as mere “details”
under the first test can be “difficult to discern,” Gorsuch found it
“hard to see how SORNA leaves the Attorney General with only
details to fill up” when it gives him the discretion “to impose on
500,000 pre-Act offenders all of the statute’s requirements, some
of them, or none of them.”88 Nor was the Attorney General’s
discretion as to pre-Act offenders conditioned on executive factfinding.89 Although Congress could have conditioned the Act’s
applicability to pre-Act offenders on a finding such as “offenders
who [] present an ‘imminent hazard to the public safety,’”
Congress did no such thing.90 SORNA “gave the Attorney
General unfettered discretion to decide which requirements to
impose on which pre-Act offenders.”91 Lastly, SORNA did not
assign authority that the executive branch already enjoyed
discretion over.92 Instead, it gave the nation’s chief prosecutor
the authority to write his own “criminal code” regarding sex
offenders who fail to register—”a quintessentially legislative
power,” Gorsuch asserted.93
“In the end,” Gorsuch argued, “there isn’t a single policy
decision concerning pre-Act offenders on which Congress even
tried to speak,”94 and SORNA vested legislative power in the
Attorney General—a violation of the separation of powers and the
nondelegation doctrine.95
While Gorsuch advocated for
enforcing the nondelegation doctrine under traditional principles,
85. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785
(1948).
86. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2140 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 2143.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991)).
91. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2143-44.
93. See id. at 2144.
94. Id. at 2143.
95. See id. at 2144-45.
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he recognized that the Court has been using other doctrines to
“rein in Congress’s efforts to delegate legislative power,” one of
which is the major questions doctrine.96
C. Justice Kavanaugh’s Paul Statement
In a statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Paul v.
United States,97 Justice Kavanaugh praised Gorsuch’s Gundy
opinion but interpreted it in a way that likened the traditional
nondelegation doctrine to the modern major questions doctrine:
I agree with the denial of certiorari because this case
ultimately raises the same statutory interpretation issue that
the Court resolved last Term in [Gundy]. I write separately
because Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent
may warrant further consideration in future cases. Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion built on views expressed by then-Justice
Rehnquist some 40 years ago in [the Benzene case]. In that
case, Justice Rehnquist opined that major national policy
decisions must be made by Congress and the President in the
legislative process, not delegated by Congress to the
Executive Branch.
In the wake of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, the Court has not
adopted a nondelegation principle for major questions. But
the Court has applied a closely related statutory
interpretation doctrine . . . .
....
Like Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 40 years ago, Justice
Gorsuch’s thoughtful Gundy opinion raised important points
that may warrant further consideration in future cases.98

More on then-Justice Rehnquist’s Benzene opinion later.99
The day the Court denied certiorari in Paul, the Court denied
a petition to rehear Gundy with a full panel of nine.100 Kavanaugh
did not participate in the decision to rehear Gundy and thus may
96. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
97. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari). The Paul case essentially presented the same issue as Gundy. See id.
98. Id.
99. See infra Part IV.A.
100. Gundy v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 579, 579 (2019) (mem.) (reh’g denied).
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or may not have wanted to retry the case, but he clearly indicated
his interest in reviving and enforcing the nondelegation doctrine
in his Paul statement issued the same day.101 But perhaps he
would go about it in a different way than Justice Gorsuch and
would incorporate the principles of the major questions doctrine.
Before that analysis, first a brief background on the major
questions doctrine as we know it.
III. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE
A. Background
The major questions doctrine is a relatively new tool.102 If
the nondelegation doctrine is a sledgehammer, the major
questions doctrine might be a kitchen utility knife, a tool used to
cut the excess fat off of an agency-fattened statute. While the
nondelegation doctrine would strike down the statute itself, the
major questions doctrine would strike down an agency’s rule
interpreting the statute.103 Technically speaking, therefore, the
two doctrines do not do the same work.
To state the major questions doctrine in one sentence: courts
will not defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute when doing so would grant the agency power
to decide a question of major economic and political
significance.104 The doctrine has traditionally been viewed as an
exception to the revolutionary “Chevron deference.”105
The Chevron case106 announced a two-step process that
courts generally follow when analyzing an agency’s
interpretation of a statute.107 At step one, a court will ask
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue” and/or whether the statute is “silent or ambiguous” on the
101. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
102. See Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The
Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 358 (2016) (noting the
doctrine’s “creation” in the 1990s, post-Chevron).
103. Cf. id. at 396.
104. See, e.g., Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).
105. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); Joshua S. Sellers, ”Major
Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930, 939 (2019).
106. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
107. E.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
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topic.108 If the statute is silent or ambiguous and Congress has
not otherwise directly spoken to the issue, the court will defer to
the agency’s interpretation so long as it is a “reasonable” one (step
two).109 “In extraordinary cases,” however, a court will not
follow that analysis if the ambiguity involves a question of “deep
‘economic and political significance.’”110 Instead, the court will
simply interpret the statute itself, rather than defer to the agency’s
interpretation.111 Chevron is premised on the theory that
Congress implicitly delegates to agencies the authority to clarify
But courts will hesitate before
ordinary ambiguities.112
concluding that Congress intended such an implicit delegation
when the ambiguity involves a question of major economic and
political significance.113
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) had interpreted its authority to
regulate “drugs” and “devices” to include cigarettes and other
tobacco products.114 Under Chevron step one, the Court went
beyond textual ambiguity and looked extensively to Congress’s
tobacco-specific legislation passed subsequent to the FDA’s
creation.115 By placing the FDA’s authority in that context, the
Court determined that Congress had in fact “directly spoken to
the question at issue and precluded the FDA from regulating
tobacco products.”116 Therefore, the analysis essentially ended at
Chevron step one, and the FDA simply could not regulate tobacco
products without clear authorization by Congress.117 The Court
clearly noted, however, that the inquiry under Chevron step one
may be influenced by the significant “economic and political”
nature of the regulatory issue.118 Regarding the FDA’s regulation
of tobacco products, the Court was “confident that Congress
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
See id. at 843-45.
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
See id. at 2489.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
Id.
Id. at 126-27.
See id. at 143-56.
Id. at 160-61.
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160-61.
See id. at 159-60.
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could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic
and political significance . . . .”119 Thus, the case was essentially
a Chevron case that ended at the ambiguity step, but the Court
provided an alternative basis for its holding under what has since
been known as the major questions doctrine.120
The Court again invoked the major questions doctrine in
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.121 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had decided to expand its power to
regulate greenhouse gasses of motor vehicles to include the
regulation of millions of stationary sources.122 The Court seemed
to skip Chevron’s analysis altogether and go straight to attacking
the EPA’s interpretation on major questions grounds.123 The
Court held that the EPA’s interpretation was “unreasonable
because it would bring about an enormous and transformative
expansion” by asserting its authority to regulate “a significant
portion of the American economy” without clear congressional
authorization.124 The Court also found significant the EPA’s
previous admissions that it did not have the very authority it
claimed to now have.125 Because the EPA’s decision to expand
its authority was one of “vast ‘economic and political
significance,’” the rule was deemed “invalid” until Congress
clearly addressed the matter.126
In King v. Burwell, the Court solidified the major questions
doctrine as independent from Chevron’s analysis.127 The case
involved the question of whether the Affordable Care Act’s tax
119. Id. at 160.
120. See Richardson, supra note 102, at 366, 370.
121. Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
122. See id. at 307, 324.
123. See id. at 324.
124. Id. (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
125. Id.
126. See Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324, 333.
127. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); see also, e.g., Richardson,
supra note 102, at 379-80. But cf. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 421 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining that
King was “somewhat different” from the typical major questions case because the statutory
provision involved “major” tax credits, not regulation of “major” private activity); Mila
Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1432 (2018) (noting that King
involved large spending by the federal government rather than by private parties and arguing
that King’s invocation of the major questions doctrine independent of Chevron should only
apply in cases with similar circumstances).
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credits were available in states that had a federal-run exchange.128
At the outset of the Court’s analysis, it declared that it would not
defer to the agency’s arguably reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute.129 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
Court, determined that this was one of those “extraordinary cases”
that involved a question of “deep ‘economic and political
significance’” because it would involve billions of dollars of tax
credits and would affect the price of health insurance for millions
of people.130 Denying Chevron deference, the Court then
proceeded to interpret the statute itself.131 The Court ultimately
concluded that the agency’s interpretation was the proper one
after all.132
B. Justice Kavanaugh’s Approach
Before taking the bench at the Supreme Court, Justice
Kavanaugh wrote an instructive opinion on his view of the major
questions doctrine as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit.133 In U.S. Telecom Association v. FCC, then-Judge
Kavanaugh outlined what he calls the major “rules” doctrine.134
In Kavanaugh’s view, such a doctrine already exists under the
Supreme Court’s precedents—it’s the major questions doctrine,
but it goes beyond simply saying that Chevron won’t apply.135
Kavanaugh’s version presumes agency rules of major economic
and political significance to be unlawful unless Congress has
clearly authorized the agency to issue such a rule.136

128. See King, 35 S. Ct. at 2485.
129. See id. at 2488-89.
130. Id. (internal citations omitted).
131. See id.
132. See id. at 2496.
133. See generally U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417-35 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
134. See generally id. For more on Kavanaugh’s “novel” doctrine, see Michael
Sebring, The Major Rules Doctrine: How Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Novel Doctrine Can
Bridge the Gap Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 189 (2018).
135. See U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 426 n.7 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc).
136. Id. at 421; Sebring, supra note 134, at 206, 212.
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The issue in U.S. Telecom was the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC)’s 2015 net neutrality rule, which classified
broadband internet as a “telecommunications service” rather than
an “information service,” thus subjecting internet service
providers to the stringent regulations of common carriers under
the Communications Act.137 Dissenting from the denial to rehear
the case en banc, Justice Kavanaugh took the opportunity to
explain that, because the FCC’s net neutrality rule was (1) a major
rule and (2) not clearly authorized by Congress, the net neutrality
rule should be declared unlawful.138 As support, Kavanaugh cited
the usual major questions cases, except, most notably, King v.
Burwell.139
Kavanaugh relegated King to a footnote where he claimed
that the Court applied a “form” of the major “rules” doctrine when
it simply denied Chevron deference and reviewed the agency’s
interpretation de novo (ultimately siding with the agency).140
This is the precise reason why Kavanaugh’s major rules doctrine
differs from the Supreme Court’s major questions doctrine: If the
Court in King had followed Kavanaugh’s formulation, it would
have declared the agency’s interpretive rule unlawful after
determining that it was a major rule,141 assuming Congress had
not clearly mandated such an interpretation.142 Of course, the
Court denied Chevron deference instead, engaged in a de novo
review of the proper interpretation, and ultimately upheld the
agency’s interpretation as the best interpretation.143 Therefore,
Kavanaugh was only left to rely on those major questions cases
where the Supreme Court actually struck down the agency’s

137. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
138. U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 422-26 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
139. Id. at 420-21.
140. Id. at 421 n.2.
141. Id. at 421.
142. In fact, the Court clearly implied that Congress had not authorized the agency’s
decision when it said, “[H]ad Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely
would have done so expressly.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal
citations omitted). The Court also explicitly said, albeit a little later in the opinion, that the
relevant section’s language was “ambiguous.” Id. at 2491.
143. See id. at 2489-96.
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rule.144 Of those cases, Utility Air provides the clearest support
for Kavanaugh’s major rules doctrine by requiring “clear
congressional authorization” for an agency to claim regulatory
authority over a decision of “vast ‘economic and political
significance.’”145
Kavanaugh maintained that “an ambiguous grant of statutory
authority is not enough” for an agency to claim regulatory
authority over a major issue (unlike Chevron deference, where it
is usually enough).146 But if any confusion existed before as to
what Kavanaugh’s doctrine requires,147 Kavanaugh provided a
succinct statement of his take on the major questions doctrine in
his Paul statement:
In order for an executive or independent agency to exercise
regulatory authority over a major policy question of great
economic and political importance, Congress must either: (i)
expressly and specifically decide the major policy question
144. See U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 420-21 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc).
145. Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (citations omitted).
However, in that case, two other factors proved significant in the Court’s decision: the EPA’s
previous admissions that it did not have the authority it granted to itself, see id., and the
EPA’s “tailoring” or “rewriting” of the statute’s un-ambiguous terms to make its
interpretation more reasonable, see id. at 325, 328.
146. U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 421 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
147. Judge Srinivasan, in his concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc, stressed
the important point that there are “two distinct species of ambiguity”: (1) ambiguity about
whether the statute itself clearly mandates a particular rule and (2) ambiguity about whether
the statute clearly authorizes an agency to issue that rule. Id. at 386 (Srinivasan, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). Srinivasan claimed that Kavanaugh wrongly
conflated the two. Id. Indeed, it is confusing. But Srinivasan confused things even further
when he restated the second species as an ambiguity that seems even broader: ambiguity
about whether the statute clearly authorizes an agency to “resolve the question,” perhaps
between a couple alternatives (which seems to have been the case here). Id. at 387. Rather
than address the differences between the [potentially three] species, Kavanaugh responded
by saying that he could not find any statutory language that “clearly classifies ISPs as
telecommunications providers” or “clearly authorizes the agency to classify ISPs as
telecommunications providers.” Id. at 426 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (emphasis added). Therefore, in his view, the statute was ambiguous in
terms of the first two species. Srinivasan, however, asserted that the Supreme Court (in its
Brand X opinion) had already determined that the statute clearly authorized “the FCC [] to
answer [the] question.” Id. at 387 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc). Both Kavanaugh and Judge Brown disputed this line of argument. Id. at 426 n.6
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); see also id. at 403 (Brown,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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itself and delegate to the agency the authority to regulate and
enforce; or (ii) expressly and specifically delegate to the
agency the authority both to decide the major policy question
and to regulate and enforce.148

In other words, Kavanaugh would uphold an agency’s major
rule so long as Congress has either clearly authorized the rule
itself or clearly delegated the authority to decide the rule.149
However, Kavanaugh now defines “clear” congressional
authorization (from U.S. Telecom) to mean “express[] and
specific[]” congressional authorization, which is a more definite
and harder standard to prove.150
What is most interesting about Kavanaugh’s Paul statement
is that it is written in the context of the nondelegation doctrine,
not the major questions doctrine. The statement was left very
open-ended, simply expressing that Gorsuch’s Gundy opinion
“raised important points that may warrant further consideration in
future cases.”151 Presumably, however, if Kavanaugh is willing
to uphold major agency rules that are expressly delegated by
Congress, he is also willing to uphold the statutory delegations
themselves. But that may not be the case, given that Kavanaugh
praised Gorsuch’s opinion, which “built on views expressed by
then-Justice Rehnquist”—who argued for nondelegation of major
questions!152 It seems odd to want it both ways. Justice Gorsuch,
however, would almost certainly not permit delegations of
authority to decide major questions, as Kavanaugh himself
recognized.153

IV. NONDELEGATION OF MAJOR QUESTIONS
Judges and commentators alike have noted the similarities
between the traditional nondelegation doctrine and the modern
148. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
149. See id.
150. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari).
151. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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major questions doctrine.154 But do they actually do the same
work as Justice Gorsuch seemed to suggest? Technically
speaking, no. The major questions doctrine can be used to
invalidate agency rules while the nondelegation doctrine can be
used to invalidate statutes.155 But they do share one major
similarity: they both operate to limit the policymaking power of
executive and independent agencies.156 In so doing, proponents
of both doctrines also have the goal of limiting Chevron’s
reach.157
One disadvantage of the major questions doctrine, however,
is that courts may be required to use it time and time again to
invalidate major agency rules that all stem from the same
statutory delegation of authority. It invites agencies to try again
and thus creates the possibility for constant litigation in the courts.
The nondelegation doctrine kills the problem at the source by
invalidating the delegation itself, thereby preventing future major
rules from being issued without clear congressional

154. See, e.g., id.; Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141-42 (2019) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting); Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1181, 1198-1203 (2018); Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions:
On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019,
2043-48 (2018); Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 60-63 (2010) (referring to the major questions doctrine as the “elephantsin-mouseholes doctrine”).
155. Cf., e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception
to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got
it Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 617-18 (2008) (discussing how the nondelegation
doctrine, unlike the major questions doctrine, constrains Congress rather than executive
agencies).
156. While both doctrines have the effect of invalidating an agency’s rule interpreting
a statute, the nondelegation doctrine goes a step further by invalidating the statute itself. Cf.
id.
157. In fact, while on the Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch invoked Marbury v.
Madison to argue for the total elimination of Chevron. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834
F.3d 1142, 1151-58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Kavanaugh has
argued to skip Chevron’s ambiguity step (step one) and go straight to interpreting the
statutory text instead. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Role of the Judiciary in Maintaining the
Separation of Powers, Lecture Before The Heritage Foundation (Oct. 25, 2017) (transcript
available at [https://perma.cc/WZ38-4RMV]). But even that would seem to render Chevron
meaningless. There would be no need for step two, because a court would always choose its
interpretation over the agency’s, even if the agency’s interpretation was a “reasonable” one.
Notwithstanding, Kavanaugh would still “defer to agencies in cases involving statutes using
broad and open-ended terms” such as “reasonable, appropriate, feasible, or practicable.” Id.
(internal quotes omitted).
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authorization.158 For example, if the major questions doctrine had
been around when Schechter Poultry was decided, it may have
been used to invalidate the Live Poultry Code because the Court
would have considered it to be a decision of major economic and
political significance.159 But the President could have continued
to establish other wide-ranging codes of regulation with an even
greater scope than the Live Poultry Code, and the courts would
be called on to invalidate those as well.160
There must be a tool the courts can use in the rarest of
circumstances to enforce the separation of powers and the
promise of the Constitution that the most important policy
decisions (at a minimum) are made only one way: by passage of
a bicameral legislature with presentment to the President.161 To
be sure, that tool is supposed to already exist—the nondelegation
doctrine. And, in fact, it was used in Schechter Poultry and
Panama Refining.162 But as it sits now, Congress can delegate
away massive swaths of policymaking authority so long as it
provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the delegee’s hand
(which has proven to mean almost anything).163 Instead of
limiting the nature or subject matter of delegations, the
intelligible principle approach is only capable of limiting the
degree of discretion within such delegated authority—and it
evidently allows a lot of discretion.164
Clearly there is an appetite for some sort of revival of the
nondelegation doctrine.
If the longstanding “intelligible
principle” test for measuring delegations is now disfavored, what
should the test be? Just within the last decade, the major questions
doctrine has found secure footing in the Supreme Court thanks to
Utility Air and King.165 Is it possible to transfer this “major
158. Cf. Moncrieff, supra note 155, at 618.
159. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
160. See id.
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; cf. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 945-51 (1983).
162. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541-42; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
430 (1935).
163. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality opinion).
164. See Cass, supra note 11, at 183-84.
165. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).
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questions” idea to the nondelegation doctrine? Does the rationale
behind the major questions doctrine—that Congress does not
implicitly delegate major questions—provide support to those
who argue for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine but
simultaneously loathe the intelligible principle approach? This
Article attempts to answer those questions in the affirmative.
Michael Sebring has argued for simply implementing Justice
Kavanaugh’s major rules doctrine with the caveat that there
should be a presumption against finding a “major rule.”166 This
may well be a “compromise solution . . . between proponents of a
fully enforced nondelegation doctrine[] and those who view the
administrative state as serving a necessary function in a modern,
complex governmental regulatory regime.”167 However, as
Sebring rightly admits, this will likely not satisfy those who
advocate for an enforceable nondelegation doctrine because it still
allows Congress to “delegate resolution of major political issues,
so long [as] Congress does so through a clear statement.”168
Therefore, a revised version of the nondelegation doctrine would
be preferred if possible, all while retaining the existing major
questions doctrine as another tool in the toolbox.
Another proposal that falls short is Professor David
Schoenbrod’s new approach.169
While recognizing the
impediments to enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine (or as
Schoenbrod calls it, the “consent-of-the-governed norm”),170
Schoenbrod has suggested a complex half-measure in which the
Court would first call upon Congress to approve any new and
significant regulations tending to violate the consent-of-thegoverned norm.171 “If Congress does not respond to the call” by
a certain date, the Court would then strike down the regulation if
it would affect the annual economy by $100 million or more.172
Although Schoenbrod claims that this test would replace the
“intelligible principle” test commonly associated with the
166. See Sebring, supra note 134, at 191, 225-26.
167. Id. at 249.
168. Id. at 246 (emphasis omitted).
169. See generally David Schoenbrod, Consent of the Governed: A Constitutional
Norm that the Court Should Substantially Enforce, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213 (2020).
170. Id. at 216, 254-55.
171. See id. at 257-58.
172. See id. at 258-59.
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nondelegation doctrine, his approach would only strike down the
regulations themselves rather than the statutes that delegate their
authority.173
A. Justice Rehnquist and the Benzene Case
As Justice Kavanaugh noted, the Supreme Court has not yet
recognized an affirmative judicial doctrine that would declare
statutory delegations of “major questions” unconstitutional.174
But at least one Justice since the dawn of the intelligible principle
approach has argued for a version of it. In the Benzene case,
Justice Rehnquist would have declared unconstitutional a
provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act because it
delegated to the Secretary of Labor the authority to make an
“important choice[] of social policy.”175 Chief Justice Burger
agreed with Justice Rehnquist’s arguments just one year later in a
similar case.176
In the Benzene case, section 6(b)(5) of the Act allowed the
Secretary to promulgate regulations of toxic materials and other
harmful substances “which most adequately assure[], to the extent
feasible, [and] on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity . . . .”177 This gave the Secretary the power to set the
lawful minimum level of exposure to harmful substances (in this
case benzene) in workplaces nationwide.178 The way in which the
Secretary was to determine the appropriate level, however, was
not clearly spelled out in the Act.179 Setting the level would
173. See id. at 262-63.
174. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari).
175. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S.
607, 685-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Additionally, Justice
Rehnquist believed that the provision at issue failed to provide an intelligible principle
sufficient to guide the Secretary’s discretion. See id. at 685-86. Justice Rehnquist would
have required challenged delegations to pass both inquiries. See id.
176. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
177. The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 612 (plurality opinion) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
655(b)(5) (1970)).
178. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
179. Cf. The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 612-14 (plurality opinion).
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naturally require a balancing of the statistical risks for health
complications or potential death with the economic costs to be
borne by employers in preventing those risks.180 The decision of
how to strike that balance (or even whether to engage in a
balancing), Justice Rehnquist argued, was “quintessentially one
of legislative policy.”181 And because he would classify it as a
“difficult,” “important,” “critical,” and “fundamental” policy
decision (seemingly using those terms interchangeably),182
Justice Rehnquist would have invalidated the relevant portion of
section 6(b)(5) of the Act as an unconstitutional delegation.183
Although he did not express it in the same way, Justice
Rehnquist would likely have regarded the Secretary’s decision as
one of “deep ‘economic and political significance,’” to use the
language of the modern major questions doctrine.184 The
Secretary’s proposed rule would have involved hundreds of
millions of dollars in compliance costs on a nationwide scale—at
least $453 million in the first year and recurring annual costs of
$34 million185—and would have involved a balancing of
statistical human lives with those economic costs.186
B. The Proposal
In this section, I argue that the Court should consider
replacing the current intelligible principle approach to the
nondelegation doctrine with an approach that declares delegations
of authority to decide “major questions” unconstitutional.
Scholars have argued a similar proposition.187 As to what
180. See id. at 672, 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
181. Id. at 686.
182. Id. at 685-87.
183. Id. at 687-88.
184. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Reg. Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
185. See The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 628-29 (plurality opinion). Notably, these are
pre-1980 figures, not adjusted for inflation.
186. Id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
187. See e.g., Cass, supra note 11, at 184, 188-93 (arguing that “the nature of the
power conferred, rather than the scope of the power, must be the linchpin for limiting
delegations” and that “policy choices of major importance” cannot be delegated); Lawson,
supra note 11, at 376-77 (arguing that “Congress must make the central, fundamental
decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary matters to the President or the courts”).
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constitutes a “major question” under the proposal, that is
answered below in subsections (2) and (3).188
1. Jurisprudential Support
While this Article does not examine the constitutional
arguments for or against the nondelegation doctrine generally, a
nondelegation doctrine that prohibits delegations of major
questions finds plenty of support in the Supreme Court’s case law.
First and foremost, the proposal is consistent with the Court’s
earliest sentiments on the topic of delegation. In Wayman v.
Southard, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court,
distinguished between “those important subjects, which must be
entirely regulated by the legislature itself” and “those of less
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power
given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill
up the details.”189 Clearly Chief Justice Marshall believed that
non-major and fill-up-the-details decisions could be delegated
away to the other branches.190 Chief Justice Marshall admitted,
however, that the line between major and non-major subjects “has
not been exactly drawn.”191 Nevertheless, the power to decide the
“important” subjects, if identifiable, is a “strictly and exclusively
legislative [power]” that cannot be delegated.192
Indeed, until the “intelligible principle” test transformed the
Court’s analysis in the mid-20th century, the Court essentially
employed a major questions approach based on the nature of the
authority delegated rather than an approach that asked whether
the delegation was specific enough.193 As Justice Gorsuch
pointed out, the Court repeatedly upheld delegations either
because they (1) only delegated the authority to “fill up the
details” or (2) made the application of a pre-decided policy
contingent on executive fact-finding.194 The Court in Panama
Refining recognized these traditional tests and specifically noted
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See infra Part IV.B.ii-iii.
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
See id. at 43-44.
Id. at 43.
See id. at 42-43.
See Cass, supra note 11, at 161-64.
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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that, as long as Congress establishes the “primary” policy
standards, those entrusted to execute the law may do what is
necessary to carry out Congress’s policy, but no more.195
Nondelegation of major questions is also consistent with the
two cases in which the Supreme Court actually used the
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate grants of authority.196 Both
cases involved delegations of major questions, and neither relied
on the intelligible principle test.197
In Panama Refining, Congress granted to the President the
power, in his sole discretion, to prohibit the interstate and foreign
transportation of petroleum in excess of what state law allowed to
be produced or removed from storage.198 Furthermore, any
violation of whatever the President decided was punishable by
fine, imprisonment, or both.199 Thus, any rule the President
promulgated would have affected the entire petroleum industry
by imposing serious constraints on its operation and commerce.200
As the Court specifically concluded, the statute did not leave mere
details to fill in, nor did it make a pre-determined policy decision
contingent on executive fact-finding.201 Congress left this major
policy decision up to the President, and the Court rightly declared
it to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.202
In Schechter Poultry, Congress granted to the President the
authority to approve entire “codes of fair competition” for
virtually any trade or industry upon application by their respective
organizations.203 Other than provide that the President’s codes
must not “promote monopolies” or oppress small businesses, the
Act contained almost no limits to what the President could
regulate.204 This gave even greater policymaking power to the
President than the more specific provision in Panama Refining.205
195. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 426 (1935).
196. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
198. Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 406.
199. Id.
200. Cf. id. at 415.
201. See id. at 430 (concluding that the statutory provision went beyond the traditional
limits of delegation).
202. See id.
203. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 522 (1935).
204. See id. at 538-39.
205. See id.
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There is no doubt this would be considered a delegation of power
to decide many major questions.
Enforcing a nondelegation doctrine that prohibits
delegations of major questions ensures that Congress—the body
most accountable to the people—makes the important policy
decisions governing society. While it has become largely
accepted that interstitial matters may be delegated,206 Congress
cannot escape its duty to make the hard policy decisions by
passing that responsibility off to others.207 As demonstrated
below, however, the test I propose is rather restrictive and would
likely not satisfy many formalist proponents of the nondelegation
doctrine.
2. How Would the Test Work?
Probably the quickest and easiest way to attack this proposed
version of the nondelegation doctrine is to write off the “major
questions” threshold as an unworkable test. However, for the
sake of doctrinal simplicity, I would adopt essentially the same
standard as the Supreme Court’s major questions doctrine, which
has typically been expressed as whether the issue is one of major
Still, there are
“economic and political significance.”208
complications in implementing this standard in the nondelegation
context.
Notwithstanding, for a moment, the potential for arbitrary
application because of the test’s broad language, how would
courts analyze whether Congress delegated a major question?
Would it be in light of the agency’s rule being challenged or by
only looking to the statute itself? Just because the agency’s rule
is considered a major one under the major questions doctrine,
does that conclusively establish that Congress improperly
delegated a major question such that the statutory provision must
be declared unconstitutional?
206. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
207. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448
U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
208. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302, 324 (2014); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 147,
160 (2000).
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I believe the better rule would be to look only to the statute
itself. Remember, the major questions doctrine is still in the
toolbox and perfectly capable of analyzing the rules themselves.
Of course, if a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine, the
agency’s rule would also be invalidated. Therefore, the test
should be whether the statute would cause the agency to decide a
question of major economic and political significance no matter
what the agency actually decided. In the event that a statute does
not violate the nondelegation doctrine under this test but the
agency’s actual rule constitutes a major decision, the major
questions doctrine is available.209 But to strike down a statute
simply because an agency wrongly interpreted the statute and
enlarged its authority unilaterally would frustrate Congress’s
ability to enact legislation.
3. “Major Economic and Political Significance” Factors
Getting back to the broad language of the test: major
economic and political significance. Critics would argue the test
could lead to arbitrary and political decisions by judges.210 It
forces judges to engage in line-drawing by deciding what
constitutes a question of major economic and political
significance.211 But the current “intelligible principle” test fares
no better: it has proved to be an unworkable test that also engages
in line-drawing and can lead to arbitrary results.212 Line-drawing
may, therefore, be inevitable in nondelegation cases, but “the
inherent difficulty of line-drawing is no excuse for not enforcing
the Constitution.”213 And I believe that the major questions test
209. However, this scenario would seem to contravene the main rationale behind the
major questions doctrine—that Congress does not implicitly delegate major questions.
210. See e.g., Gordon, supra note 20, at 823. Cf. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 154, at
45-48 (discussing, in the major questions doctrine context (but using “elephants-inmouseholes”), how major questions are often “in the eye of the beholder” and how the
Supreme Court Justices have been very unpredictable when applying the doctrine);
Moncrieff, supra note 155, at 612-13 (arguing that a “bare majorness rule” for the major
questions doctrine would be “error-prone because the majorness line is too difficult to
administer”).
211. See Sebring, supra note 134, at 242-43.
212. See, e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 155, at 619.
213. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 61 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
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would come closer to enforcing the Constitution’s separation of
powers than the intelligible principle test. The solution to the
line-drawing problem is to ensure that the test has as much
guidance as possible. Therefore, I would adopt a set of factors—
most of which have already been recognized by the Supreme
Court in its major questions cases—along with a presumption
against finding a major delegation.
With all the factors, it is important under this proposal to
divorce the statute’s language from the agency’s rule being
challenged. Just because an agency’s rule may be considered
major by the factors doesn’t necessarily mean that Congress
delegated a major question. It might just mean that the agency
wrongly interpreted and expanded the authority granted to it by
Congress. Again, the proposed test is whether the statute would
cause the agency to decide a major question no matter what
decision it reached.214 This is a serious limitation on the doctrine.
Furthermore, I would impose a presumption against finding
a major delegation since the test could prove to be arbitrary and
unpredictable in the most difficult cases. The presumption
against finding a violation would provide predictability and
would limit the doctrine’s application to only the clearest
violations.215 It would also help to alleviate the legitimate
concern that judges might invalidate congressional statutes based
on their subjective determination that a particular issue is a major
one. Nevertheless, some combination of the following factors
could overcome the presumption and thus determine that a
delegated issue is one of major economic and political
significance.

214. Despite the fact that some delegations may present the binary choice of the
delegee to regulate or not regulate (similar to the delegation in Panama Refining), this should
not preclude the nondelegation doctrine’s enforcement under this proposal. Presumably, if
an agency’s rule or regulation is being challenged, the delegee has chosen to regulate.
Therefore, so long as Congress has delegated the authority to act, the nondelegation doctrine
can be used to invalidate a statutory provision based on those potential positive actions.
215. Cf. Sebring, supra note 134, at 225-26 (arguing for a similar presumption in the
context of the major “rules” doctrine).
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a. Economic Impact
The inevitable economic impact of an agency’s
interpretation or rule under the statute would be one of the most
relevant factors. Economic impact has been a significant factor
in almost every major questions case.216 This usually involves the
amount of costs imposed on the industries and private parties
regulated.217 However, the Court in King took notice of the
“billions of dollars in [government] spending each year.”218
Admittedly, it may be quite difficult in many cases to discern the
inevitable economic impact simply by looking to the statute’s
language. Therefore, it may be permissible for the Court to make
reasonable inferences from the amount of economic impact
caused by the agency’s actual rule when determining what the
impact might be if another rule were issued. And of course, if the
agency’s actual rule does not cause a major economic impact, the
statute itself cannot be faulted for purposes of this factor.
b. Scope of Regulation
Often discussed in conjunction with economic impact, the
Court has looked to the scope of regulation in its major questions
cases.219 This factor looks to (1) whether the regulation affects
an entire major industry, (2) the number of industries or people
affected, and (3) whether the regulation applies on a nationwide
scale.220 The larger the scope of the inevitable regulation, the
more likely a major delegation exists.221
c. Political Significance
Another factor that has played a role in many major
questions cases is the amount of political engagement or
controversy surrounding an issue.222 For example, in Gonzales v.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See Richardson, supra note 102, at 382-83.
See Sohoni, supra note 127, at 1425-26.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
See Sebring, supra note 134, at 215-16.
See id. at 216, 218-20.
See id. at 220.
See Richardson, supra note 102, at 383.
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Oregon, the Court noted “[t]he importance of the issue of
physician-assisted suicide, which has been the subject of an
‘earnest and profound debate’ across the country . . . .”223 This
factor may be measured by the degree of public attention to the
issue or the amount of political debate among politicians in
Washington.224 However, this factor alone most assuredly should
not be dispositive because of the risk that some judges may
subjectively find a particular issue to be “major” or “important”
when others would not.
d. Conduct Regulating or Liberty Restrictive
The last factor under the proposal does not measure a
question’s “majorness” per se. Rather, it is a threshold factor that
must be met for a violation of the nondelegation doctrine to exist:
the statute must have granted the delegee the authority to adopt a
rule of general applicability regulating conduct or restricting
personal liberty.225 Furthermore, if a delegation grants the
authority to restrict personal liberty or impose criminal penalties,
the delegation’s “majorness” likely is bolstered when combined
with other factors.226
Article I’s vesting clause has been interpreted as prohibiting
Congress from delegating away its “legislative power.”227 While
scholars have argued over the precise meaning of “legislative
power,” Alexander Hamilton described Congress’s power as the
power to “prescribe[] the rules by which the duties and rights of
every citizen are to be regulated.”228 In 1810, the Court described
it as the power to “prescribe general rules for the government of
society.”229 Therefore, at a minimum, Congress must have
delegated the authority to adopt a rule of general applicability
223. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997)).
224. See Richardson, supra note 102, at 384; see also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855
F.3d 381, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc).
225. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
226. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
227. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality opinion).
228. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 575 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed.,
1864).
229. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136.
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regulating conduct for there to be a violation of the nondelegation
doctrine.
A strict formalist approach would declare all
delegations of “legislative power” to violate the doctrine.230
Under this proposal, however, the distinction is that the
delegation of legislative power must also be “major” to violate
the nondelegation doctrine. While surely unsavory to the strict
formalists (of which there are very few these days), this approach
responds to the endless debate over the precise definition of
“legislative power” and serves as a compromise between the
formalists and those pragmatists who would argue that Congress
is incapable of making many hard policy decisions itself.231
In both Gundy and a former Tenth Circuit case, Justice
Gorsuch stressed the idea that grants of authority to decide
whether to restrict people’s personal liberty, and specifically
whether to impose criminal penalties, are especially egregious.232
For purposes of this proposal, Gorsuch would likely regard those
questions that impose restrictions on personal liberty as major
questions, or at least more major.233 This factor, however, will
not be enough in itself.
For example, in Gundy, the Attorney General’s authority to
decide whether to impose SORNA’s registration requirements on
pre-Act offenders would affect approximately half a million
people in addition to imposing criminal penalties for those failing
to meet the requirements.234 Therefore, the scope of regulation is
somewhat significant, and the liberty-restricting nature of the
delegation heightens its “majorness.” This may or may not,
however, be enough to overcome the presumption against finding

230. See Sean P. Sullivan, Powers, But How Much Power? Game Theory and the
Nondelegation Principle, 104 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1245 (2018).
231. Cf., e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”).
232. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131, 2144-45, 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672-73 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc).
233. See Nichols, 784 F.3d at 672-73 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (“It’s easy enough to see why a stricter rule would apply in the criminal
arena. The criminal conviction and sentence represent the ultimate intrusions on personal
liberty and carry with them the stigma of the community’s collective condemnation . . . .”).
234. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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a major delegation. It would likely come down to whether the
question has a large economic impact or political significance.235

V. CONCLUSION
The recent surge in interest in reviving the nondelegation
doctrine236 combined with the dissatisfaction of the intelligible
principle approach comes at a time when the Court has
strengthened and established its major questions doctrine. It is
for this reason that I propose a revision in the Court’s approach to
the nondelegation doctrine. The proposal is merely a starting
point, however, and would undoubtedly need some refining. I
invite others to critique the proposal and point out its potential
flaws. But it seems that there comes a point when the separation
of powers must be enforced. That line, I believe, can easily be
drawn by requiring (at a minimum) that Congress make the most
important and significant decisions regulating society.

235. As for economic impact, Justice Gorsuch mentioned in his dissent that applying
SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act offenders threatened to impose costly
burdens on states. Id. at 2132. It may also have an economic impact in the sense that more
taxpayer money would be used to imprison those pre-Act offenders who would violate
SORNA’s requirements. As for political significance, it’s hard to see how imposing
penalties on sex-offenders is an especially controversial political issue.
236. This Article was first written before Justice Ginsburg’s passing. Now with Justice
Barrett and Justice Kavanaugh on the Court (Kavanaugh did not participate in the Gundy
decision), there may be two extra votes to enforce the nondelegation doctrine. However, it
doesn’t appear that Justice Barrett ever decided a nondelegation case while on the Seventh
Circuit. She previously discussed, without arguing against, the Supreme Court’s lax
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine in an article regarding the specific issue of
whether Congress may delegate to the President the decision to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus during an emergency. See Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and
Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 317-19 (2014). Justice Barrett’s general views of the
doctrine are likely influenced by her mentor, Justice Scalia, who struggled in nondelegation
cases to decide between two of his most closely held, but conflicting, tenets: (1) the
preference of deferring to Congress on matters of policy and thus avoiding judicial
intervention into Congress’s decision to entrust others with discretion and (2) enforcing the
Constitution’s express separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches.
See generally William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and
Constitutional Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107 (2017).

